INQUISITION
An Inquisition taken for our Sovereign Lady the Queen

At Southwark on the 15th day of July 2009 and by adjournment on the 18th day of March 2013

Her Majesty's Assistant Deputy Coroner for the Inner South District of Greater London

The following matters were found:
1. Name of Deceased
   Felipe Francisquin Cervi

2. Injury or disease causing death
   a. Inhalation of fire fumes

3. Time, place and circumstances at or in which injury was sustained
   See attached narrative verdict.

4. Conclusion of the Coroner as to the death
   See attached narrative verdict.

5. Particulars for the time being required by the Registration Acts to be registered concerning the death

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>(a) Date and place of birth</th>
<th>19.09.05 London</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(b) Name and Surname of deceased</td>
<td>Felipe Francisquin Cervi</td>
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<tr>
<td>(c) Sex Male</td>
<td>(d) Maiden surname of woman who has married n/a</td>
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<td>(e) Date and place of death 03.07.09 Flat 81, Lakanal House, Sceaux Gardens, Camberwell SE5 7DP</td>
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<td>(f) Occupation and usual address n/a Flat 81, Lakanal House, Sceaux Gardens, Camberwell SE5 7DP</td>
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Signature of Her Majesty's Coroner

Signature of Jurors (if present)
Felipe Francisquini Cervi

Felipe Francisquini Cervi died in the bathroom of flat 81 of Lakanal House on 03/07/09 between 1745 and 1800 hours. Fatal injuries were sustained by the inhalation of fire fumes generated from the initial fire in flat 65 and subsequent fires in flats 79, 37 and 53.

After the fire started in Flat 65, the flames spread through the composite panels of Flat 79.

Whilst sheltering in Flat 81 Felipe Francisquini Cervi was overcome by smoke from the numerous fires in Lakanal House.

Smoke entered Flat 81 from the 11th floor corridor, as well as from the bathroom ventilation duct. This duct was directly connected to secondary fires lower down the building.

Evidence suggests these fires were caused by flaming debris falling from Flats 65 and 79.

When the front door of Flat 79 collapsed into the 11th floor corridor, smoke and fire were able to spread along the corridor and enter Flat 81 because:

(a) The 'boxing in' under the stairs of Flat 81 failed to provide the required 60 minutes fire resistance;

(b) There were no fire seals on the front door of Flat 81;

(c) There was a lack of fire-stopping on internal pipework from previous renovations;

(d) The panel above the door of Flat 81 failed to provide adequate resistance.

All of these factors, in addition to the interconnected bathroom ducts contributed to a serious failure of compartmentation.

Had a fire risk assessment been carried out at Lakanal House, it is possible that these features may have been highlighted for further investigation.

The installation of a new heating system in the 1980s would have been an opportunity to ensure that the fire-stopping around pipes leading into Flat 81, and segmentation within the suspended ceiling, offered adequate protection from fire.

The 2006/7 refurbishment provided numerous opportunities to consider whether the level of fire protection of the building was adequate.

If the panel above the door of Flat 79, and the boxing in of both Flats 79 & 81 had been fire resistant to 60 minutes, the spread of fire and smoke into the roof cavity of the 11th floor
corridor would have been greatly limited.

If the roof cavity had been adequately protected, the occupants of the bathroom in Flat 81, including Felipe Francisquini Cervi, would in turn have had significantly less exposure to smoke.

In addition, fire fighters could have channelled resources more heavily towards search and rescue rather than active fire fighting.

Finally, it would have extended the period in which Felipe Francisquini Cervi could have escaped to the east balcony via the internal stairs of Flat 81.

With regard to firefighting operations, the initial attack on Flat 65 was both adequate and timely.

The extensive smoke logging in the communal corridors led to the bridgehead being moved, and firefighters becoming involved in rescuing residents from flats other than Flat 81.

Rescue attempts to Flat 81 were significantly hampered by the effects of smoke logging.

By moving the bridgehead further down the building on account of secondary fires in Flats 37 and 53, the firefighters had further to go to reach Flat 81 on the 11th floor, and used more oxygen from their BA due to the efforts involved in doing so.

The unprecedented move of the bridgehead placed demands on time, resources, and manpower, which hampered rescue attempts.

If firefighters had been aware of the precise location of Flat 81 a rescue may have been effected before Felipe Francisquini Cervi sustained fatal injuries.

When speaking with the adults in Flat 81, it would have been appropriate for London Fire Brigade personnel to follow standard guidance advising persons to 'stay put', had they not been affected by smoke or fire. Given the worsening smoke, it would have been appropriate for the LFB to have used such a call to explore potential routes and means of escape.

There was a clear expectation by Brigade Control that trapped persons would be rescued by firefighters.

Their advice to the caller relied heavily on this assumption.

The training of brigade control officers failed to promote active listening or encourage operators to react to dynamic or unique situations.

Between 16.36 and 17.32 there were numerous calls made between Brigade Control and members of the public concerning families trapped in Flat 81.
Although Brigade Control informed firefighters of Flat 81, insufficient efforts were made to prioritise the flat and to deploy BA wearers specifically to this location in time to save the occupants.

Several of Felipe Francisquini Cervi's family members also spoke in person to members of the London Ambulance Service and the London Fire Brigade, communicating the whereabouts of Felipe Francisquini Cervi and his family members.

As was the case with other flats in the building, the firefighters had little knowledge of the layout and numbering system of Lakanal House. Thus, Flat 81 was not reached in time to save the occupants.

Consideration was given to the safety of those in flats above the fire in Flat 65.

However, confusion about the layout and the rescuing of residents elsewhere meant that flats directly above the fire were not actually reached in time.

Given the young age of Felipe, it would be unrealistic to assume he could have escaped unassisted. It would have been possible for Felipe Francisquini Cervi, accompanied by an adult, to have left the bathroom of flat 81 without assistance from the fire brigade up until approximately 17.15 using the escape balcony on the east side of the building.

Unfortunately, evidence suggests that the adults with Felipe Francisquini Cervi were unaware of escape routes such as this, and where they led to.